We consider a simple extension of the basic new-Keynesian setup in which we relax the assumption of frictionless …nancial markets. In our economy, asymmetric information and default risk lead banks to optimally charge a lending rate above the risk-free rate. Our contribution is threefold. First, we derive analytically the loglinearised equations which characterise aggregate dynamics in our model and show that they nest those of the newKeynesian model. A key di¤erence is that marginal costs increase not only with the output gap, but also with the credit spread and the nominal interest rate. Second, we …nd that …nancial market imperfections imply that exogenous disturbances, including technology shocks, generate a trade-o¤ between output and in ‡ation stabilisation. Third, we show that, in our model, an aggressive easing of policy is optimal in response to adverse …nancial market shocks.
Introduction
Central banks devote much e¤ort to the analysis of the …nancial positions of households, …rms and …nancial institutions, and to monitor the evolution of credit aggregates and interest rate spreads. One reason is that …nancial market conditions are perceived to be factors which contribute to shape the performance of the economy and to a¤ect its in ‡ationary prospects.
In several historical episodes, central banks have also reacted sharply to changes in …nan-cial conditions. One example are the US developments during the late 1980s, when banks experienced large loan losses as a consequence of the bust in the real estate market. Due to weak …nancial conditions, banks could not raise new capital and, because of the requirement to comply with the Basel Accord, they were forced to cut back on loans. This led to a slowdown in credit growth and aggregate spending. According to Rudebusch (2006) , this slowdown con- Developments of the sort outlined above raise obvious questions on the appropriateness of these policy responses. Through which exact channels are these shocks transmitted to the real economy? Should …nancial market variables matter per se for monetary policy, or should they only be taken into account to the extent that they a¤ect output and in ‡ation? Can an increase in credit spreads generate a large enough economic reaction to justify interest rate cuts of the magnitude observed over 2007-2008? The answer to these questions requires an analysis of the optimal monetary policy implications of models in which …nancial frictions play a causal role. It is also important to understand how exactly …nancial frictions interact with other distortions, notably nominal rigidities, to modify the scope for monetary policy actions.
To study whether and how …nancial market conditions ought to have a bearing on monetary policy decisions, we analyze the simplest possible extension of the basic new-Keynesian setup, in which results can be derived analytically. We assume that …rms need to pay wages in advance of production and that informational frictions imply that they must borrow at a premium over the risk-free rate. As in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1989) and Fuerst (1997, 1998) , we rely on the costly state veri…cation set-up in Townsend (1979) to characterise the optimal debt contract between …rms and …nancial intermediaries. The advantage of relying on a micro-founded debt contract is that the model parameters will be policy invariant and our optimal policy analysis will not be subject to the Lucas critique.
We obtain two main sets of results.
First, we show that the loglinear approximation of the aggregate structural equations of our model is similar in structure to the one arising in the new-Keynesian setup with frictionless …nancial markets. As in the new-Keynesian case, private sector decisions can be characterized by an intertemporal IS equation and a Phillips curve. These relationships, however, include additional terms to re ‡ect the existence of informational asymmetries. The main di¤erence is that …rms'marginal costs re ‡ect, on top of the costs of labour input, also the credit spread and the nominal interest rate. The latter two variables matter because they determine the cost of credit for …rms in the economy.
The loglinearized equilibrium equations also show that technology and …nancial market shocks operate as exogenous cost-push factors in the model. This is noticeable for technology shocks, which in the benchmark model with frictionless …nancial markets generate fully e¢ cient ‡uctuations in output and consumption. In our model, however, these ‡uctuations produce variations in …rms'exposure to external …nance and leverage. The ensuing volatility in credit spreads and bankruptcy rates represents the ine¢ cient implications of technology shocks in the presence of credit frictions.
Our second set of results concerns optimal policy. Using an analytic, second-order approximation of the welfare function, we demonstrate that welfare is directly a¤ected not just by the volatility of in ‡ation and the output gap, as in the benchmark case with frictionless …nancial markets, but also by the volatility of the nominal interest rate and of the credit spread. As a result, the target rule which would characterise optimal policy under discretion ought to include a reaction to credit spreads, even if with a small coe¢ cient.
We also study whether optimal monetary policy should strive to bring equilibrium allocations back to a fully e¢ cient level, or whether instead it should only attempt to implement a constrained optimum in which …nancial frictions are treated as given. The latter option may appear to be intuitively appealing, based on the observation that credit spreads ultimately stem from an information asymmetry which cannot be eliminated through policy interventions. In our model, however, …nancial market imperfections will interact with other frictions, such as nominal price rigidity. Consistently with general second-best results, it will turn out to be the case that monetary policy can undo some of the adverse implications on welfare of …nancial market imperfections.
We then characterise optimal policy under commitment from a numerical viewpoint. We show that the optimal policy reaction to technology shocks is not dramatically di¤erent from the case with frictionless …nancial markets and from the prescriptions of a simple policy rule of the Taylor type. More speci…cally, near complete in ‡ation stabilization remains optimal.
In reaction to a …nancial market shock which increases the credit spread, however, optimal policy deviates markedly from the prescriptions of a Taylor rule. The main channel through which a persistent increase in credit spreads a¤ects the economy has to do with the dynamics of the cost of credit. If this goes up after an exogenous shock, …rms will incur a higher cost of servicing their debt and they will therefore try to increase their mark-ups. As a result, real wages will fall, persistently so if the original shock is also persistent. The expected persistent reduction in real wages will induce an immediate drop in households'consumption, which will be the main driver of the economic slowdown.
A Taylor rule would prescribe an interest rate tightening to meet the rise in in ‡ation. Optimal monetary policy, however, is aggressively expansionary after the shock. While sustaining the in ‡ationary pressure through the ensuing stimulus of aggregate demand, the interest rate cut directly contrasts the cost-push e¤ect on in ‡ation of the higher spread. The net e¤ect on in ‡ation is actually milder than under a Taylor rule.
Our paper is not the …rst attempt to analyze monetary policy in models with credit frictions. Ravenna and Walsh (2006) characterizes optimal monetary policy when …rms need to borrow in advance to …nance production. However, there is no default risk in that model and the cost of …nancing for …rms is the risk-free rate. We show that our model nests that of Ravenna and Walsh (2006) in the special case in which the costs of asymmetric information disappear. Faia and Monacelli (2006) compares the welfare losses of various optimized simple interest rate rules in models with a structure similar to ours, but it does not characterize fully optimal (Ramsey) monetary policy. Similarly, Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2006) argues that the monetary policy reaction to a stock market boom/bust cycle would be superior, in terms of welfare, if liquidity developments were taken into account.
Our paper is closest to recent work by Cúrdia and Woodford (2008) , which also characterizes optimal monetary policy in a model where …nancial frictions matter, because of heterogeneity in the spending opportunities available to di¤erent households. Our work di¤ers in the underlying source of …nancial frictions. Financial frictions are microfounded in our model and credit spreads arise from an explicit characterization of optimal debt contracts. Cúrdia and Woodford (2008) assume instead a ‡exible, reduced-form function linking the credit spread to macroeconomic conditions. Finally, Faia (2008) studies optimal monetary policy in a model with microfounded …nancial frictions similar to ours, but the focus of that paper is solely on technology shocks and the richer environment prevents an analytical characterization of the results.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we describe the environment and derive the conditions characterizing the equilibrium of the economy when …nancial contracts are written in nominal terms. In section 3, we discuss the log-linearized version of our model, in comparison to the new-Keynesian benchmark. This enables us to highlight the e¤ect of …nancial market frictions on in ‡ation and output dynamics. In section 4, we derive a simple quadratic approximation of the social welfare, which we compare to the one arising under frictionless …nancial markets. In section 5, we derive the …rst-order conditions of the social planner problem under discretion and we discuss the role of …nancial frictions for the optimal conduct of monetary policy. We then characterize numerically optimal monetary policy under commitment. Section 6 concludes.
The environment
The economy is inhabited by a representative in…nitely-lived household and by a continuum of risk-neutral entrepreneurs. Households own …rms producing di¤erentiated goods in the retail sector, while entrepreneurs own …rms producing a homogeneous good in the wholesale sector.
Financial market imperfections, in the form of asymmetric information and costly state veri…cation, a¤ect the activity of wholesale …rms. These …rms produce according to a technology that is linear in labor and subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Entrepreneurs need to raise external …nance to pay workers in advance of production but, due to the idiosyncratic shock, they face the risk of default on their debt. Lending occurs through perfectly competitive …nancial intermediaries ('banks'), which are able to ensure a safe return to households by providing funds to the continuum of …rms. Firms and banks stipulate debt contracts, which are the optimal contractual arrangements between lenders and borrowers in this costly state veri…cation environment.
The timing of events is as follows. At the beginning of the period, after the occurrence of aggregate shocks, the …nancial market opens. Households make their portfolio decisions.
They decide how to allocate nominal wealth among existing assets, namely money, a portfolio of nominal state-contingent bonds, and deposits. Deposits are collected by a zero-pro…t bank and used to …nance …rms'production. Each wholesale …rm stipulates a contract with a bank in order to raise external …nance.
In the second part of the period, the goods market opens. Wholesale …rms produce homogenous goods and sell them to the retail sector. If revenues are su¢ cient, they repay the debt and devote remaining pro…ts to the …nancing of entrepreneurial consumption. Otherwise, they default and their production is sized by banks. Firms in the retail sector buy the homogeneous good from wholesale …rms in a competitive market and use them to produce di¤erentiated goods at no costs. Because of this product di¤erentiation, retail …rms acquire some market power and become price makers. However, they are not free to change their price at will, because prices are subject to Calvo contracts. Retail goods are then purchased by households and wholesale entrepreneurs for own consumption.
Households
At the beginning of period t; the …nancial market opens. First, the interest on nominal …nancial assets acquired at time t 1 is paid. The households, holding an amount W t of nominal wealth, choose to allocate it among existing nominal assets, namely money M t ; a portfolio of nominal state-contingent bonds Z t+1 each paying a unit of currency in a particular state in period t + 1;
and one-period deposits denominated in units of currency D t paying back R d t D t at the end of the period.
In the second part of the period, the goods market opens. Households' money balances are increased by the nominal amount of their revenues and decreased by the value of their expenses. Taxes are also paid or transfers received. The amount of nominal balances brought into period t + 1 is equal to
where h t is hours worked, w t is the real wage, V t are nominal pro…ts transferred from retail producers to households, and T t are lump-sum nominal taxes collected by the government.
c t denote a CES aggregator of a continuum j 2 (0; 1) of di¤erentiated consumption goods produced by retail …rms,
with " > 1: P t (j) denotes the price of good j; and
is the price of the CES aggregator.
Nominal wealth at the beginning of period t + 1 is given by
where R m t denotes the interest paid on money holdings. The household's problem is to maximize preferences, de…ned as
where u c > 0; u cc < 0; m 0; mm < 0 and v h > 0; v hh > 0; and m t M t =P t denotes real balances. The problem is subject to the budget constraint 
Moreover, the optimal allocation of expenditure between the di¤erent types of goods leads to the demand functions
where P t (j) is the price of good j.
Wholesale …rms
The wholesale sector consists of a continuum of competitive …rms, indexed by i; owned by in…nitely lived entrepreneurs. Each …rm produces the amount y i;t of a homogeneous good, using a linear technology
Here A t is an aggregate, serially correlated productivity shock and ! i;t is an idiosyncratic, iid productivity shock with distribution function and density function .
The production function (9) re ‡ects our choice to abstract from capital accumulation. This is in contrast with most of the literature that introduces credit frictions in macro-models, where entrepreneurs are assumed to decide in period t how to allocate their pro…ts to consumption and investment expenditures (see e.g. Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) ). The value of the stock of capital available to …rms in period t + 1 provides the …rm with a certain net worth (internal funds) that can be used in that period production.
In that environment, aggregate shocks a¤ect the evolution of …rms' net worth, thus creating endogenous persistence. In our model, we assume instead that each …rm receives a constant endowment at the beginning of each period, which can be used as internal funds. Since these funds are not su¢ cient to …nance the …rm's desired level of production, …rms need to raise external …nance. As a result, …nancial frictions have important e¤ects also in our economy. For example, a spread arises endogenously between the loan rate charged by …nancial intermediaries to …rms and the risk-free rate, to re ‡ect the existence of default risk. At the same time, our simpler set-up enables us to provide an analytical characterization of economic dynamics and of optimal policy in the presence of credit constraints and information asymmetry.
Labor demand
As in Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) and Ravenna and Walsh (2006) , we assume that …rms need to pay factors of production before the proceeds from the sale of output are received.
Firms need to raise external …nance to pay for wages. Before observing the idiosyncratic productivity shock, and after observing the aggregate shocks, they sign a contract with the …nancial intermediary to raise the amount P t (x i;t ) ; for total funds at hand P t x i;t ; where 1
We assume that entrepreneurs sell output only to retailers. Let P t be the price of the wholesale homogenous good, and
the relative price of wholesale goods to the aggregate price of retail goods. Each …rm i's demand for labor is derived by solving the problem
subject to the …nancing constraint (10) , where the expectation E[ ] is taken with respect to the idiosyncratic shock unknown at the time of labor hiring decision, and w t denotes the payment of labor services measured in terms of the …nal consumption good: Denote the Lagrange multiplier on the …nancing constraint as (q i;t 1). Optimality requires that
x i;t = w t l i;t (12) implying that
Equation (13) states that, as the production function is constant return to scale, wholesale …rms must sell at a mark-up t q t over …rms'production costs. This allows them to cover for the presence of monitoring costs and for the monopolistic distortion in the retail sector. This latter matters for …rms in the wholesale sector because P t is the de ‡ator of the nominal wage, and thus a¤ects real marginal costs faced by wholesale producers.
Equation (12) states that the …nancing constraint is always binding. Given the contract stipulated by the …rm with the …nancial intermediary (which sets the amount of funds x i;t and the repayment on these funds), the …rm always …nds it pro…table to use the entire amount of funds and to produce, also when expected productivity is low. This way, it can minimize the probability of default.
The …nancial contract
Loans are stipulated in units of currency after all aggregate shocks have occurred, and repaid at the end of the same period. Lending occurs through the …nancial intermediary, which collects deposits from households and use them to …nance loans to …rms.
Firms face an idiosyncratic productivity shock, whose realization is observed at no costs only by the entrepreneur. The …nancial intermediary can monitor its realization but only at a cost, which is assumed to be a fraction of the value of the loan. If the realization of the idiosyncratic shock is su¢ ciently low, the value of the …rm's production is not su¢ cient to repay the loan and the …rm defaults. Households lend to …rms through a …nancial intermediary, which is able to ensure a safe return. This is possible because by lending to the continuum of …rms i 2 (0; 1) producing the wholesale good, the …nancial intermediary can di¤erentiate the risk due to the presence of idiosyncratic shocks.
The informational structure corresponds to a costly state veri…cation problem. The solution is a standard debt contract (see e.g. Gale and Hellwig, 1985) which is derived in the appendix.
The terms of the contract are identical for all …rms. The optimality conditions can be written
where ! t is a threshold for the distribution of the idiosyncratic productivity shock below which …rms go bankrupt, and f (! t ) and g (! t ; t ) are the expected shares of output accruing to the entrepreneur and the bank, respectively. t denotes the share of value of the …rm's input which is lost as a result of monitoring activities. Given the large time-variation in bankruptcy costs documented by Natalucci et al. (2004), it is assumed to be subject to serially correlated shocks.
Compared to the standard assumption of real debt contracts employed by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1989) and Fuerst (1997, 1998) , our assumption of nominal contracts has two consequences.
The …rst is that monetary policy has real e¤ects in our model -beyond those caused by the assumption of Calvo prices. The reason is not related to the impact of the higher nominal interest rate on the quantity of loans. Substituting equation (14) into equation (15), it can be noticed that a change in the nominal interest rate has no direct impact on the amount of real funds borrowed by entrepreneurs (the amount of funds is only modi…ed in general equilibrium, to the extent that it induces changes in the threshold ! t ). The real e¤ects of monetary policy arise entirely through the impact of the nominal interest rate on the …nancial mark-up q t . An increase in the nominal interest rate increases the opportunity cost of lending funds for the …nancial intermediary and is therefore passed on to loan rates. The real e¤ects of monetary policy in our model are therefore similar to those present in a cost-channel model. Loan rates, however, increase more than one-to-one with respect to the risk-free rate. The increase the latter variable makes it more di¢ cult for …rms to pay back their debt, and default probabilities must increase. As a result, credit spreads must also rise in equilibrium.
The second e¤ect of the assumption of nominal contracts is that the fraction of the loan lost in monitoring activities is also in terms of currency, not in terms of physical goods -as is typically the case when contracts are in real terms. Intermediate …rms sell their entire output to the retail sector at the end of the period and use the monetary proceedings from the sale to pay bank loans. To the extent that banks choose to monitor individual …rms'productivity levels, some of the money will not be available to pay households' deposits. Thus …nancial frictions do not generate a loss of resources in our economy, but introduce an additional cost to be taken into account by banks when agreeing on an appropriate interest rate on loans.
An important implication of this assumption is that ‡uctuations in bankruptcy rates will only have an impact on utility (and welfare) indirectly, to the extent that they have undesirable implications on the mark-up q t or in the amount of loans. With real contracts, on the contrary, monitoring costs amount to a distruction of goods which would otherwise have been available for consumption: ‡uctuations in bankruptcy rates therefore have a direct utility cost.
The gross interest rate on loans can be backed out from the debt repayment, which requires
. This expression can be used to write the spread between the loan rate and the risk-free rate, t R l t =R d t , as
Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs have linear preferences over consumption and are in…nitely lived. They consume a CES basket of di¤erentiated goods similar to that of households.
At the end of each period, entrepreneurs sell their output to the retail sector and, if they do not default, repay the debt. Remaining pro…ts are entirely allocated to …nal consumption
where e i;t (j) is …rm i's consumption of good j. Notice that R 1 0 P t (j) e i;t (j) = P t e i;t ;where e i;t is the demand of the …nal consumption good of entrepreneur i. Aggregating across …rms, we obtain e t = f (! t ) q t x t , where e t = R 1 0 e i;t di is the aggregate entrepreneurial consumption of the …nal consumption good. Using equations (14)- (15), we can rewrite aggregate entrepreneurial consumption as
Equation (17) shows that entrepreneurial consumption depends only on the nominal interest rate, on the bankruptcy threshold ! t , and on the exogenous shock t .
As mentioned above, an increase in the nominal interest rate has no direct e¤ect on loans and a¤ects …nancial conditions mainly by inducing an increase in the mark-up q t . This re‡ects into higher …rms' pro…ts so that, ceteris paribus, a higher R t leads to an increase in entrepreneurial consumption.
Changes in the threshold ! t act instead by modifying the output share f (! t ) (together with g ( t ; ! t )). Since f (! t ) and entrepreneurs' pro…ts are decreasing in the threshold, an increase in bankruptcy rates tends to depress entrepreneurial consumption.
Finally, a higher t induces changes in the threshold ! t . If total production changes little, …rms have to pay a higher interest rate spread to cover for higher monitoring costs, and ! t tends to increase, leading to a reduction in entrepreneurial consumption. If however the shock is su¢ ciently contractionary, the demand for credit will fall and ! t will decrease.
Retail …rms
As in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), monopolistic competition occurs at the "retail"
level. More speci…cally, a continuum of monopolistically competitive retailers buy wholesale output from entrepreneurs in a competitive market and then di¤erentiate it at no cost. Because of product di¤erentiation, each retailer has some market power. Pro…ts are distributed to the households, who own …rms in the retail sector.
Let Y t (j) be the quantity of output sold by retailer j. This quantity can be used for households'consumption, c t (j) ; and for entrepreneurs'consumption, e t (j). Hence,
The …nal good Y t is a CES composite of individual retail goods
with " > 1:
Price setting
We assume that each retailer can change its price with probability 1 ; following Calvo (1983).
Let P t (j) denote the price for good j set by retailers that can change the price at time t; and Y t (j) the demand faced given this price. Then each retailer chooses its price to maximize expected discounted pro…ts, given by
where
Denote P t as the optimal price set by producers who can reset prices at time t: The …rst-order conditions of the …rm's pro…t maximization problem imply that
Using the expression for the aggregate price index,
and substituting out
Pt , we can recursify the …rst order condition as
Price dispersion
Recall that the aggregate retail price level is given by
Pt and divide both sides by P t to express everything in terms of relative prices, 1 =
De…ne also the relative price dispersion term as
This equation can be written in recursive terms as
Monetary policy
Monetary policy will be characterised either as an optimal Ramsey plan, or as a simple Taylortype rule.
In addition, however, the central bank needs to specify a rule for either R m t or M s t : It is convenient to express this rule in terms of m;t . In order to facilitate the comparison of our model with the standard New-Keynesian setup, we assume that
and we can de…ne
Under a policy of constant m;t ; money demand becomes recursive and can therefore be neglected for the solution of the system.
We assume a functional form
1+' and we de…ne t+1 log t+1 , b p t (j) = log p t (j), a t = log A t , and b t = log t .
Market clearing
Market clearing conditions are listed below.
Money:
Bonds:
Labor:
Loans:
Wholesale goods:
Retail goods:
The appendix presents the system of equilibrium conditions linearized around a zero-in ‡ation steady state.
In order to characterize the optimal response of monetary policy, it is convenient to rewrite the linearized system in deviation from the e¢ cient equilibrium. This latter is an equilibrium where t = 0, 0, prices are ‡exible, the monopolistic distortion is eliminated with an appropriate subsidy, and R t reacts to technology shocks in such a way as to achieve zero in ‡ation. In the presence of the cost channel, ‡uctuations in R t also introduce a distortion in the economy. We provide households with a subsidy that compensates for such distortion, as in De Fiore and Tristani (2008). We denote a variable with a hat and a superscript e as the log-deviation of the variable from its steady state in the e¢ cient equilibrium, which is characterized by
b r
and where b r e t denotes the real interest rate. We …nd it useful to de…ne the output gap, e Y t ; as actual output in deviation from e¢ cient output, when both variables are linearized around the actual steady state Y . Note that under this de…nition the output gap will not be zero in steady state, but equal to the di¤erence between the two steady states y log Y log Y e .
We can now rewrite the system as
1 '
1 ' 
where g denotes the partial derivative of g (! t ; t ) with respect to .
Equation (19) shows that the spread between the loan rate and the policy rate increases with excess aggregate demand. An increase in the demand for retail (and thus also for wholesale) goods implies an implicit tightening of the credit constraint, since the exogenously given amount of internal funds must now be used to …nance a higher level of debt. The increased default risk generates a larger spread. For the same reasons, the spread decreases with the nominal interest rate. An increase in the latter variable generates a reduction in the demand for …nal goods and thus in the demand for input in their production (wholesale goods). For a given amount of internal funds, leverage and the risk of default fall, reducing the spread.
Equation (20) is a forward-looking IS-curve describing the determinants of the gap between actual output and its e¢ cient level. The …rst line of the expression shows that, as in the standard new-Keynesian model, the gap is a¤ected by its expected future value and by the real interest rate. In our model, however, the output gap also depends on the expected change in the nominal interest rate and in the credit spread, as well as on the shock t . Note that this dependence is not present in a cost channel model: it would disappear in the absence of monitoring costs.
A higher spread between loan and deposit rates is contractionary in our model, because it induces an increase in bankruptcy rates and a fall in entrepreneurial consumption. In our calibration, an expected increase in the spread between periods t and t + 1 tends instead to be expansionary, in spite of the fact that entrepreneurs are myopic in their consumption patterns. The transmission of this e¤ect operates through households'consumption. Through the aggregate resource constraint, the reduction in t + 1 entrepreneurial consumption, which is due to the higher expected spread, also tends to imply an increase in future households' consumption. Since households are forward looking, this e¤ect will feed through to current households'consumption, thereby leading to an expansionary e¤ect on output.
On top of the standard real interest rate e¤ect, changes in the nominal interest rate have an impact on output which operates through similar, but opposite, channels to those of the spread. A higher nominal interest rate will in fact have a small expansionary e¤ect, as it will increase the …nancial mark-up and entrepreneurial consumption. However, an expected increase in the nominal interest rate will be contractionary, as it will lead to an expected fall in households'future consumption.
Equation (21) The credit spread and the nominal interest rate act as endogenous "cost-push" terms in the economy. While pushing up marginal costs and in ‡ation, an increase in either term also exerts downward pressure on economic activity. For the nominal interest rate, this happens through the ensuing increase in the real interest rate, which induces households to postpone their consumption to the future. For the credit spread, the main channel of transmission to aggregate demand is a fall in the real wage, through which …rms try to o¤set the increase in …nancing costs.
All three equations (19), (20), (21) are also a¤ected by all exogenous disturbances, which therefore act as exogenous "cost-push" factors in the Phillips curve. More speci…cally, technology shocks are also partly ine¢ cient through their e¤ect on the credit market. This is in contrast with the standard new-Keynesian model, in which they only generate e¢ cient variations in output. The reason is that the output expansion which will typically follow a positive technology shock generates the need for an increase in external …nance and in leverage, hence leading to an increase in the credit spread. In turn, the higher credit spread will a¤ect output and in ‡ation through the channels described above.
In the remainder of this section, we show that our model nests both the cost-channel model of Ravenna and Walsh (2006) and the standard new-Keynesian model.
We consider …rst the special case when monitoring costs are zero, i.e. t = 0; for all t and 0. In this case, …rms still need to borrow in advance of production. However, the information asymmetry concerning wholesale …rms'productivity disappears because banks can monitor at no cost. Economic dynamics can then characterised as (see the Appendix)
The equations above coincide with the reduced-form system of equilibrium conditions obtained by Ravenna and Walsh (2006) in their model of the "cost-channel," where …rms borrow in advance of production but, since there is no asymmetric information nor default risk, they simply pay the risk-free rate on these funds.
Finally, the system would boil down to the new-Keynesian model in the absence of nominal debt contracts, in which case the nominal interest rate would not a¤ect marginal costs.
Impulse responses
As a benchmark for comparison with the optimal policy case, we provide some evidence on the The structural parameters are set in line with the literature. We set long-run monitoring costs at 15% of the …rm's output, i.e. = 0:15, a value consistent with the empirical estimates in Levin, Natalucci and Zakrajsek (2004). We then calibrate the standard deviations of idiosyncratic shocks ( ! ) and the subsidy so that that the annualized steady state spread is equal to 2% and roughly 1% of …rms go bankrupt each quarter. As to monopolistic competition and retail pricing, we assume " = 7, leading to a steady-state mark-up of 17%, and a probability of not being able to re-optimize prices = 0:66, implying that prices are changed on average every 3 quarters. Finally, we set the persistence of technology and monitoring cost shocks to 0.9. Our model also has implications for the stock of credit and the spread between loan and deposit rates. Credit expands almost one-to-one with production and households'consumption, but this also implies an increase in leverage, as …rms'net worth is constant. As a result, the bankruptcy rate in the economy increases and so does the credit spread.
A pro-cyclical response of the credit spread to technology shocks is standard in models adopting the Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) set-up, but the data show that spreads tend to increase during recessions -this is the case, for example, for the di¤erence between lowest and highest rates on corporate bond yields in the US (see e.g. Figure 1 in Levin et al., 2004 ).
This is a problem in terms of the ability of our model to replicate a key feature of the credit market data solely through ‡uctuations in technology shocks. Nevertheless, our model would indeed be capable of generating countercyclical credit spreads, if other shocks were allowed to 2 Since the steady states of output y and of the e¢ cient level of output y e are di¤erent, the output gap term in the Taylor rule is written as gap = b yt b y The similarity between the impulse responses of the di¤erent models in Figure 1 is also likely to be related to our simplifying assumption which prevents …rms from accumulating net worth during expansions. The quantitative implications of our model would probably change if we relaxed this assumption. For example, it would reduce the procyclical response of spreads to technology shocks, as …rms would not need to …nance the whole expansion in output through an increase in external funds. Their leverage would therefore not increase as much as it has to when internal funds are given. This would also generate more substantial di¤erences between the impulse responses of models with and without …nancial frictions. Nevertheless, Figures 1 and 2 suggest that it may be very di¢ cult to discriminate empirically across models without looking also at …nancial variables, such as interest rate spreads or the stock of loans. They also suggest that the existence of credit frictions is not a su¢ -cient ingredient for …nancial variables to play a quantitatively important role in shaping the monetary policy transmission mechanism. At least in our set-up, even if …nancial variables do react endogenously to economic developments and do play a direct role in the way shocks are transmitted through the economy, they modify little the reaction of output and in ‡ation to "standard" macroeconomic shocks.
In spite of the results in Figures 1 and 2 , however, credit frictions turn out to be important in two respects. First, they modify the objective of monetary policy compared to the case of frictionless …nancial markets. Second, they become relevant when shocks which a¤ect the macroeconomy originate in …nancial markets. We analyze these two implications of credit frictions in the remainder of the paper.
Second order welfare approximation
Following Woodford (2003), we obtain a policy objective function by taking a second order approximation to the utility of the economy's representative agents. Since our economy is populated by households and entrepreneurs, the policy objective function will be a weighted average of the (approximate) utility functions of these two agents. The approximation to the objective function takes a form which nests the one in the benchmark new-Keynesian model (see Woordford, 2003 ) as a special case.
Under the functional form for household's utility de…ned above, the appendix shows that the present discounted value of social welfare can be approximated by
where & is the weight assigned to households'utility, t:i:p: denotes terms independent of policy and
where b e t is log-entrepreneurial consumption (in deviation from the steady state) and { and are parameters de…ned in the appendix.
The …rst three terms in equation (26) The quadratic term in entrepreneurial consumption is due to two reasons. On the one hand, ‡uctuations in entrepreneurial consumption must be accompanied by changes in households' consumption through the aggregate resource constraint. Hence, households dislike ‡uctuations in b e t . On the other hand, entrepreneurs enjoy consumption volatility, because of their risk neutrality. The sign of the overall term proportional to b e 2 t in social welfare depends on which one of these two e¤ects prevails, which is in turn determined by the relative importance of households in social utility.
The linear term in entrepreneurial consumption highlights the potential redistributional e¤ects of policy in our model. A higher value of entrepreneurial consumption is obviously bene…cial for entrepreneurial welfare. At the same time, any entrepreneurial consumption is detrimental for households' welfare, as it subtracts from the economy resources which could be consumed by households. The net e¤ect of this term on welfare is again determined by the relative weight of households in social utility.
This linear term actually tends to dominate all second order terms. Depending on the exact weight of households in welfare, our model can therefore generate very di¤erent welfare implications and, as a result, di¤erent optimal policy responses to shocks. Given the simplicity of our framework, we prefer not to take a stance on the weight which would be most realistic given the relative size of entrepreneurs in actual economies. Instead, we select the weight so as to neutralise the redistributional incentives of optimal policy and, as a result, to maximise the comparability of our results with those of the standard new-Keynesian model.
The particular weight which achieves this objective is & = 1 + c 1
1
. As a result, …rst order terms disappear entirely from social welfare.
Under this special weight &, the loss function simpli…es to
where equations (16) and (17) were used to write entrepreneurial consumption in terms of the nominal interest rate b R t , the credit spread b t and the exogenous shock b t . This expression allows us to perform a complete derivation of optimal policy using the linearized policy equations
Compared to the case of the standard new-Keynesian model, the novel terms in expression (27) are those with a coe¢ cient proportional to e=c (notice that these terms vanish when entrepreneurs disappear from the economy and Y = c).
These novel terms include …rst, within square brackets, elements proportional to the squared nominal interest rate and the squared loan-deposit rate spread. Hence, the presence of asymmetric information in the economy introduces directly both an interest rate smoothing and a "spread smoothing" motive for optimal policy. At the same time, these terms are relatively small in our calibration, where households'consumption takes up the lion share of output. Under normal circumstances, therefore, the interest rate smoothing concern is unlikely to be predominant compared to the objective of maintaining price stability.
The term within square brackets in equation (27) also includes a number of cross products between endogenous variables. More speci…cally, a planner would be averse to a positive covariance between the nominal interest rate and the loan-deposit rates spread. A high covariance would increase the volatility of entrepreneurial consumption, with negative spillovers on households'consumption-smoothing motive. The planner would however not be averse to a positive covariance between, on the one side, the output gap, on the other side, either the interest rate or the loan-deposit rates spread. A negative output gap, for example, would be welfare improving if accompanied by a fall in the policy interest rate, such that only entrepreneurial consumption would su¤er from the reduction in output, while households'consumption would remain unchanged.
Finally, the last term in equation (27) shows that increases in the nominal interest rate and in the credit spread have a positive e¤ect on welfare, if they are accompanied by an increase in the e¢ cient level of output -i.e. an increase in productivity. The reason is that households are willing to reap the bene…ts of the higher productivity on real wages, but wish to smooth their consumption pattern over time. Higher …rms' pro…ts and entrepreneurial consumption at a time of high productivity helps to achieve the latter objective.
Our derivations above write welfare in terms of deviations from the e¢ cient equilibrium.
An alternative possibility would be to write all variables in deviation from the values which they would take in a "natural" equilibrium, in which prices are ‡exible and …nancial contracts are denominated in real terms. In a more general context, De Fiore and Tristani (2008) demonstrates that such an equilibium can be de…ned independently of monetary policy; it also demonstrates that price stability would be maintained at all times in the economy with nominal rigidities, if policy interest rates were set so as to "track" real rate of interest prevailing in the natural equilibrium. One may therefore conjecture that the natural equilibrium should coincide with the best implementable allocation in our economy. More speci…cally, one may think that a fraction of the variation in credit spreads due to e¢ cient shocks -notably technology shocks -should also be e¢ cient, and that this fraction should coincide with the behaviour of spreads in the natural equilibrium.
It turns out, however, that in our economy monetary policy can do better than implementing the natural equilibrium. Our numerical results below show that optimal policy would choose not to maintain price stability at all times, even if this equilibrium would be implementable by the aforementioned policy of tracking the natural rate. Consistently with general second-best results, monetary policy can undo some of the adverse implications on welfare of …nancial market imperfections.
5 Optimal policy
Discretion
When the welfare function can be approximated as in (25) and (27), the problem of the central bank is to maximize that objective, subject to the system of equilibrium conditions (19)-(21).
The appendix shows that, in the special case in which ' = 0 and 1 = 1, the target rule which characterizes the discretionary equilibrium takes the simple form
for parameters and e de…ned in the appendix.
Note that, in the frictionless case, = 1 1 and e = 0 so that the optimality condition In our model, the target criterion which would be followed by a central bank under discretion is a¤ected by the existence of …nancial frictions. While the output gap remains important, both other endogenous variables and shocks limit the ability of the central bank to use the output gap to achieve the desired level of in ‡ation. A surge in in ‡ation could also be countered through actions which a¤ect the spread b t and the nominal interest rate.
In addition exogenous shocks, including both the …nancial shock b t and technology shocks (through the e¢ cient level of output b Y e t ), a¤ect the target criterion. This implies that the optimal in ‡ation rate varies in the face of these shocks. Di¤erently from the benchmark newKeynesian case, some temporary deviations from the central bank's objective may occasionally be desirable.
Optimal monetary policy under commitment
We characterize numerically the optimal monetary policy under commitment in the special case characterized above in which linear terms disappear from the quadratic approximation of the welfare function. Under this assumption, steady state in ‡ation is zero and the linear system in equations (19)- (21) is a correct approximation. 3 In all cases, we concentrate on optimal policy under a timeless perspective, as in Woodford (2003) . Figure 3 displays impulse responses to a technology shock when monetary policy is set optimally. Once again, for the technology shock we contrast optimal policy in the credit channel model with the optimal policies which would arise in a model with the cost-channel and in the standard new-Keynesian model. 4 Compared to the results in Figure 1 , optimal policy leads to more signi…cant di¤erences in the three models considered here. As is well-known, optimal policy would ensure complete price stability and full stabilization of the output gap in the new-Keynesian model. The policy interest rate would fall on impact and then return slowly to the baseline.
Under the credit channel, near-full in ‡ation stabilization remains optimal in response to technology shocks. However, the path of the policy interest rate which achieves this outcome would be somewhat di¤erent. The policy rate is kept constant for one period, before reaching levels roughly consistent with those in the new-Keynesian model. Partly as a result of the slowed monetary easing, output increases less than in the e¢ cient equilibrium and a negative output gap ensues.
The impulse response of the output gap highlights the di¤erences between our model and the cost channel model. In the latter case, the impact reduction in the nominal interest rate is more marked -even if not as aggressive as in the new-Keynesian benchmark -and strongly expansionary, so that the output gap increases after the technology shock. This is not the case in our model because of the increase in the spread, which remains procyclical as in the simple rule benchmark. 3 Our numerical results are based on a full second order approximation of the policy equations, which we perform using Dynare.
We compute the …rst order conditions of the welfare maximisation problem of the policy maker using Giovanni Lombardo's lq_solution routine available at http://home.arcor.de/calomba/symbsolve4_lnx.zip. 4 In all cases, we assume the existence of a steady state subsidy which eliminates …rst-order terms in output from the second-order expansion of individuals'utility. The subsidy is slightly di¤erent in the three cases: it is equal to = ( 1) in the new-Keynesian model, R = ( 1) in the cost-channel model, and q = ( 1) in our model. Figure 4 displays impulse responses to a positive shock to b t . This shock is representative of a broader array of "…nancial shocks" which could be de…ned in our model, notably shocks to the subsidy, or to the standard deviation of idiosyncratic shocks.
The increase in b t , which is assumed to be persistent, acts like a classical cost-push shock: it depresses households'consumption and output while creating in ‡ationary pressures. On the one hand, it generates an immediate increase in the loan-deposit rate spread -the shock is normalized to produce a 1 percentage point increase in the spread. The larger spread pushes up …rms' marginal costs and thus generates in ‡ationary pressure. On the other hand, the increase in marginal costs also generates an increase in the mark-up q t , which exerts downward pressure on wages. In general, households react to the lower wage rate with a reduction in both their labour supply and in their demand for consumption goods. In our particular calibration -utility is logarithmic in consumption and linear in leisure -labour supply is fully elastic and the adjustment takes place entirely through consumption, which falls one-to-one with the real wage.
In our model, therefore, the depressionary e¤ects on output of an adverse …nancial shock do not arise directly through the higher cost of working capital induced by the higher loan rates. Since we abstract from investment, aggregate demand is actually very little sensitive to the increase in loan rates. The reason is that households'consumption, which represents the bulk of aggregate demand, is only a¤ected by the risk-free nominal interest rate. The main channel through which the adverse …nancial shock is transmitted to the real economy has to do with the fact that surviving …rms, i.e. …rms which do not go bankrupt, need to make higher pro…ts to …nance the higher cost of …nance. It is the ensuing reduction in real wages which produces the main squeeze on aggregate demand.
The policy response under a Taylor rule is to increase interest rates to meet the in ‡ationary pressure. In spite of this policy response, in ‡ation rises by 1 percentage point, partly due to the cost-channel e¤ect of the nominal interest rate. The increase in b t also leads to an increase in bankruptcy rates, while the amount of credit falls.
Hence, contrary to the case of the technology shock, the spread moves anti-cyclically in response to a …nancial shock.
Compared to the responses under the Taylor rule, those obtained under optimal policy are striking because the policy interest rate moves in the opposite direction. Interest rates are immediately cut very aggressively and stay low for approximately one year, in spite of the in ‡ationary pressure. The main reason for this policy response is that the …nancial shock is ine¢ cient, hence the fall in households' consumption is entirely undesirable. The marked expansion in monetary policy is aimed at smoothing households'consumption path after the shock. At the same time, the interest rate cut counters in ‡ation through the cost channel, even if it tends to fuel in ‡ation through the aggregate demand stimulus.
All in all, compared to the Taylor rule case, households'consumption moves very little on impact and only reaches levels consistent with those attained under the Taylor rule after 3 quarters. At the same time, the increase in in ‡ation is less pronounced, and less persistent than in the Taylor rule case.
Conclusion
Using a small, microfounded model with nominal rigidities and credit frictions, we have analyzed the implications of …nancial market conditions on macroeconomic dynamics and on optimal monetary policy.
In our simple set-up, it is possible to characterize analytically the linearized aggregate relations of the model and to obtain an approximate welfare criterion consistent with the microfoundations of the model. Our results show that, in general, monetary policy ought to pay attention to the evolution of …nancial market conditions, as captured for example by changes in credit spreads. On the one hand, these changes matter because they a¤ect …rms' marginal costs and have therefore an impact on output and in ‡ation. On the other hand, they matter because of their impact on entrepreneurial consumption.
In our numerical analysis, we …nd that despite the presence of cost-push factors introduced by …nancial market frictions, optimal monetary policy does not produce substantial deviations from price stability. Nevertheless, our results suggest that there might be good reasons for a central bank to react with an aggressive easing to an adverse …nancial shock. Those types of shocks create an ine¢ cient recession, whose negative consequences on consumption can be reduced.
Our results should help improve our understanding of the determinants of optimal policy decisions in models with credit frictions. The numerical …ndings presented in the …gures should however be interpreted as an illustrative example. Their precise quantitative features should be cross-checked against those derived from more complex models with more realistic features.
A The …nancial contract
The informational structure corresponds to a costly state veri…cation problem. The solution is a standard debt contract (see e.g. Gale and Hellwig, 1985) such that: i) the repayment to the …nancial intermediary is constant in states when monitoring does not occur; ii) the …rm is declared bankrupt when the …xed repayment cannot be honoured; iii) in case of bankruptcy, the …nancial intermediary monitors and completely seizes the …rm's output.
Recall that the presence of agency costs implies that y i;t = ! i;t t q t x i;t : De…ne
as the expected shares of output accruing respectively to an entrepreneur and to a lender, after stipulating a contract that sets the …xed repayment at P t t q t ! it x i;t units of money. In case of default, a stochastic fraction t of the input costs x i;t ; measured in units of money, is used in monitoring. We assume that t follows a AR1 process. At the individual …rm level, total output is split between the entrepreneur, the lender, and monitoring costs so that
The optimal contract is the pair (x i;t ; ! i;t ) that solves the following costly state veri…cation problem:
max P t t q t f (! i;t )x i;t subject to P t t q t g(! i;t )x i;t R d t P t (x i;t )
P t [f (! i;t ) + g (! i;t ; t ) 1 + t (!)] 0 (30) P t t q t f (! i;t )x i;t P t
The optimal contract maximizes the entrepreneur's expected pro…ts subject to the lender being willing to lend out funds, (29), the feasibility condition, (30), and the entrepreneur being willing to sign the contract, (31). Notice that the intermediary needs to pay back to the household a gross return equal to the safe interest on deposits, R d t : Since in equilibrium R t = R d t ; the …nancial intermediary's expected return on each unit of loans cannot be lower than R t .
The optimality conditions can be written as
x i;t = R t R t q t g (! i;t ; t ) :
From equation (32), it follows that the terms of the contract depend on the state of the economy only through the aggregate mark-ups t and q t and the return R t . Hence, they are the same for all …rms, ! i;t = ! t : Since initial wealth is also the same across …rms, it follows from equation (33) that the size of the project is the same across …rms.
B The system in reduced form
The system of equilibrium conditions that characterizes the evolution of the aggregate variables (once a monetary policy rule is speci…ed) can be linearized around a zero-in ‡ation steady state 
where hats denote log-deviation of a variable from the steady state.
This maximizes banks' pro…ts, as they can size the production of all defaulting …rms at no cost. In such equilibrium, g (! t ; t ) = 1 t y t e t = Y t = c t + :
Moreover, from the bank's zero pro…t condition, we have
The log-linearized system can then be written as
In the limiting case where 0; q t = R t and the system boils down to the equations reported in the text.
D Welfare approximation
Our monetary policy objective is derived as the second order approximation to a weighted average of the utilities of the household and of the entrepreneur, i.e.
where & is the weight of the utility of households in the policy objective. Households'temporary utility can then be approximated as Under perfect competition and frictionless credit markets, …rms set the real wage at the marginal product of labor, w t = A t : In our model, equation (11) Legend: brown stars: optimal policy; blue solid line: simple rule. Note: linear terms in the second order expansion of utility are set to zero through an appropriate steady state subsidy and a particular Pareto weight.
